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The appellants submit this Reply Brief pursuant to
Rule 24(c) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
(REPLYING TO RESPONDENT'S POINT I)
ASSUMING THAT FREIER AND DAVIS ARE CO-EMPLOYEES
OF SCHRENK, KANARRA AND/OR MANZA, FREIER'S CLAIM IS
NOT BARRED BY UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-60, BUT IS
ALLOWED UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-57
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-57 ("Section 57") provides that
if

an injured

Workers'

employee's

Compensation

employer

Act

does

("Act")

by

not comply with the
providing

workers'

compensation insurance, that employee may pursue a common law
negligence

action

against

employee's co-employee.

the

employer

and/or

the

injured

This is an exception to the exclusive

remedy of Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-60 ("Section 60").
Davis argues, without citing any case authority, that
the exception of Section 57 applies only to employers and not
to negligent co-employees.
Power

& Light

Davis's cite to Mountaineer v. Utah

Co., 773 P.2d

nothing to do with this case.
workers' compensation

benefits

405

(Utah Ct. App. 1989) has

Mountaineer simply says that if
are available

to the injured

employee, that is his exclusive remedy against the employer or
fellow employee.

The appellants don't disagree with that, but

that's not this case.
available

to Jeremy

No workers' compensation benefits were
Freier.

Freier
1

is free

to pursue his

negligence

claim against his employer or co-employee.

This

position is supported by Peterson v. Sorenson, 91 Utah 507, 65
P.2d 12 (1937).

In Peterson, the Utah Supreme Court stated:

It is contended that if an employer does
not carry compensation insurance, he and
his employees are denied the advantages
provided by the statute and relieved from
the liabilities of the act, and that they
remain under their common-law rights and
liabilities. . . . The real question,
therefore, is: Is the defendant within or
without the exclusive remedy provisions of
the Workers' Compensation Act?
(Emphasis
added.)
Id. at 15.
The

Peterson

court

went

on

to

hold

that

a

non-

complying employer is not within the provisions of the Act and
then stated:
[T]he employee is not required to rely on
the Industrial Act at all as a basis for
recovery
against
the
non-complying
employer. . . . The mere fact that the
Industrial Act contains the provisions
which make it less burdensome for plaintiff
to establish his claim and take from
defendant
certain
defenses
does
not
justify the conclusion that the cause of
action
is
one
created
by
statute.
Moreover, the non-complying employer "shall
not be entitled to the benefit of this
title during the period of noncompliance."
Section 42-1-54 (former Section 57).
Id. at 17. (Emphasis and parenthetic statement added.)
This
contradicts
complying

quotation

Davis's
employer

from

statement
in

a

case

the
that
does
2

Peterson

case

"the presence
not

thrust

directly
of

the

a noninjured

employee out of the workings
scheme

and

into

the

morass

(Respondent's Brief at p. 9.)
of a non-complying

of the workers' compensation
of

common

law

actions."

That's exactly what the presence

employer does.

The appellants do not,

however, think that common law actions are such a "morass."
The question is simply whether or not Davis was negligent.
Davis

argues

that

a negligent

co-employee

of

an

employer not complying with the Act should not be subject to a
negligence claim of an injured co-employee.
the

negligent

co-employee

"cannot

police

Davis argues that
his

employer's

compliance with the Act and therefore is not penalized for the
employer's non-compliance."

(Respondent's Brief at p. 8.)

Davis cites no authority for that position.

The appellants

submit that no such authority can be found.

Such a position

assumes

that,

absent

the

Act,

negligent

co-employees

are

entitled to some kind of inherent immunity from negligence
claims.

That's not true.

Negligent co-employees are entitled

to the Act's statutory immunity through no act of their own,
but because their employers have complied with the Act.
as

here, the employer

does

not

When,

comply with the Act, the

negligent co-employee is, and should be, subject to common-law
negligence liability.

Peterson v. Sorenson, 91 Utah 507, 65

P.2d 12 (1927).

3

Davis

misinterprets

the

appellants'

Molino v. As her f 588 P.2d 1033 (Nev. 1979).

reliance

on

In Molino, the

Nevada Supreme Court held that, under the Act, the Legislature
only

intended

employer

to

would

exempt

be

the

negligent

responsible

for

co-employee

the

negligence

if the
of

the

employee under the doctrine of respondent superior and the if
employer provided benefits under the Act.

Ici. at 1035.

In

other words, in a situation where the Act does not apply
because of the employer's non-compliance, the Legislature did
not intend to exempt the negligent co-employee from liability.
This conclusion is consistent with the Utah Supreme
Court's decision in Holmstead v. Abbott GM Diesel, 27 Utah 2d
109, 493 P.2d 625 (1972).

Holmstead states that a negligent

employee is individually responsible for his conduct whether or
not

he

is

in the

scope

of

his

employment.

Whether the

employee is in the scope of his employment is relevant only to
the

employer's

negligence.
Davis's

vicarious

liability

for

that

employee's

Freier seeks no vicarious liability recovery from

alleged

employers.

Davis

is,

and

should

be

responsible for his own negligence.
Section 57 allows Freier to pursue this negligence
claim against Davis.

Summary judgment on the exclusive remedy

of Section 60 was error.
4

POINT II
(REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S POINT II)
JEREMY FREIER WAS NOT AN EMPLOYEE OF SCHRENK, KANARRA,
AND/OR MANZA UNDER THE ACT. AT THE LEAST, QUESTIONS
OF FACT EXIST REGARDING JEREMY'S EMPLOYMENT STATUS
Davis claims that Freier "has the burden to prove he
is within one of the exceptions [i.e., not an employee] and is
not precluded from recovery outside of the Act."
Brief p. 17.)

That's wrong.

(Respondent's

The burden of proof is on the

party attempting to use the Act as a shield to avoid tort
liability.

If that party

fails to meet that burden, the

exclusive remedy provision of the Act does not apply and the
civil action may go forward.

Basin Land Irrigation Co. v. Hal

Butte Canal Co., 114 Idaho 121, 754 P.2d 434 (1988).

Davis has

not met his burden.
Even if Freier had the burden to prove that he was
not an employee, all of the deposition testimony cited in his
Brief carries that burden or, at least, creates fact issues for
a jury to determine.

Davis's statement that "Jeremy Freier

failed to provide any evidence that he fell within any of the
exceptions to Act" is specious

in light of the deposition

testimony set forth in Freier's Brief.
Davis argues that Freier is an employee under the
definition of Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-43

("Section 43").

In

cases factually similar to this one, however, the Utah Supreme
5

Court

has

held

that

workers

employees under the Act.

like

Jeremy

Freier

are

not

One such case is Board of Education

of Alpine School District v. Olsen, 684 P.2d 49 (Utah 1984).
In that case, a carpenter acting as a volunteer in woodshop
classes was deemed not to be an employee under Section 43. The
factors included in the Court's decision also apply to Freier's
relationship with Kanarra and Manza:
In the present case, Olsen received no
compensation for helping in shop classes.
. The school district had no control
over his hours or any aspect of his
volunteer work. There is no evidence that
he or the school district intended to
establish an employment relationship, even
an informal one. . . . In conclusion, there
is no evidence that an implied contract of
hire existed
between
the parties.
Therefore, there is no basis for the
conclusion that Olsen was an employee for
purposes of workers' compensation.
Id. at 52.
For those same reasons, Freier was not an employee
under

Section

4 3 and

he

may

pursue

his

negligence

claim

against Davis.
Davis argues that Keith Schrenk was an employer under
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-42(3)(a)(ii) because he employed more
than five workers.

Davis claims at least eight employees,

including Schrenk, Justin Anderson and Jeremy Freier.

Schrenk

and Anderson are excluded under the statute because they are

6

immediate
Freier.

family.

That

leaves

six

"employees"

including

That is the minimum allowed for Schrenk to qualify as

an employer.

Davis

testified

that

Schrenk would

just hire

"really anyone from town" to do jobs as necessary. (R. 273, p.
6).

That raises the additional factual question of whether any

of these "employees" were casual employees under Utah Code Ann.
§35-1-43.

If so, they cannot qualify as employees under the

Act and Schrenk cannot qualify as an employer under Utah Code
Ann. § 35-1-42(3)(a).

Whether someone is a "casual employee"

under the Act is a question of fact.

Heck v. Dow, Inc. , 9 3

Idaho 377, 461 P.2d 717 (1969).
The number of "employees," however, does not end the
inquiry.
Davis

The statute has hourly and weekly work requirements.

does

evidence

not

in the

address
record

these
about

issues
the

because

there

is

no

time these people worked.

Without that evidence, Davis cannot carry his burden of proving
that

Schrenk

is

an

employer

under

Utah

Code

Ann.

§ 35-1-

42(3)(a).
Davis next addresses the control issue and makes an
interesting flip-flop from his position in the trial court.

In

the trial court, Davis tried to use the control issue to show
that Freier was an employee, stating that "since there was so
much control exercised over Jeremy Freier, he was, as a matter
of law, an employee of Keith Schrenk, Kanarra Partnership and
7

Manza Investment, Inc." (R. 158).

On appeal, Davis realizes

that the question of control is a fact issue making summary
judgment improper.

Davis, therefore, discounts the control

issue, stating that "the issue of control is only relevant in
distinguishing between a worker's status as an employee or as
an independent contractor."

(Respondent's Brief p. 14). Davis

can't have it both ways.
The test for determining whether an employer-employee
relationship exists is whether one has the right to control the
details of another individual's work.

State ex rel. Ferguson

v. District Court, 519 P.2d 151 (Mont. 1974).
control is a question of fact.
(Alaska

1982).

The question of

Moloso v. State, 644 P. 2d 205

The deposition testimony regarding control

cited by Freier in his initial Brief creates factual issues
that must be determined by a jury.
Finally, on the control

issue, Davis claims that

there was "no evidence that Jeremy Freier had any independence
in his performance of the work on the farm."
Brief p. 15).
independence.

(Respondent's

The evidence shows that Freier had complete
As explained by Shirlee Reeves, Jeremy didn't

even have to be there.
(R. 269, p. 32.)

He could have left any time he wanted.

Schrenk had no authority or control over

Freier.

8

Davis claims that because of the remedial purpose of
the

Act, courts

That

are more

is true, but not

employee

status.

for the reason Davis claims.

Courts

broadly construe the term
order

to

provide

willing

to

find

"employee" in favor of coverage in

compensation

benefits

to

injured

workers.

Maryland Casualty Company v. Industrial Commission, 12 Utah 2d
223,

364

P.2d

1020

(1961).

The

Act's

"remedial

purpose"

referred to by Davis is to "create a system whereby the injured
employee would be assured of medical and hospital care and a
certain

though

modest

compensation

for

injuries.

Smith v.

Brown, 27 Utah 2d 155 157, 493 P.2d 994 (1972).
The term
benefits;

not

employees.

to

"employee" is broadly construed to provide
provide

broader

immunity

to negligent co-

As discussed in Freier's initial Brief, the Act was

enacted to protect employers providing statutory benefits, not
to

protect

negligent

co-employees.

When

no

benefits

are

available, as here, the Act should be construed to allow the
fullest

recovery

for

the

injured

worker.

Davis's

interpretation of the Act limits the injured worker's ability
to such recovery by expanding the definition of those entitled
to

tort

immunity,

even

when

the

benefits.

9

employer

has

provided

no

POINT IIA
(REPLYING TO RESPONDENTS POINT IIA)
MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT EXIST AS TO WHETHER SCHRENK
WAS AN EMPLOYER UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-42(3)(a)(ii)
Many of Davis's arguments in Point IIA are addressed
by Freier
without

in Point

citing

II of this Reply Brief•

authority, that once prima

Davis asserts,

facie evidence

is

presented that the injured employee is an "employee" under the
Act, the burden of proof shifts to the injured employee to show
that he is not such an "employee*"
Freier does not agree that this is the law.

Even if

it were, Freier disputes that Davis has presented prima facie
evidence that Freier was an "employee" under the Act.

Davis

does

Davis

not explain what

that prima

facie evidence

is.

argues that Freier cannot rest on bare allegations.

Neither

can Davis.
Davis
evidence

alleges

that

Freier

"did

not

present

any

in the form of affidavits, or in any other form as

otherwise provided by Rule 56, that showed Jeremy Freier could
fall within one of the exceptions provided by the Act."
is simply false.

That

Deposition testimony, as outlined in Freier's

initial Brief, was cited to raise questions of fact regarding
Schrenk as an agricultural employer, the number of "employees"
at the farm, the control exercised over Freier, and Freier as a
casual

employee.

The

material

10

facts

are

disputed

and

susceptible

to

more

than

one

logical

inference.

Summary

Judgment was improper.
POINT IIB
(REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S POINT IIB)
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FREIER AND SCHRENK
SATISFIES THE CASUAL EMPLOYMENT STANDARD
Davis claims, without citation to the record, that
hauling rocks out of the field was
furtherance
occupation."
are

not

of

[Schrenk's]

"necessary to, or in the

usual

trade,

business

or

Other than statements by Davis's counsel, which

evidence,

there

is

nothing

in

the

record

even

addressing what Schrenk's usual trade business or occupation
is,

a

necessary

element

of

determining

casual

employment.

Summary judgment was improper.
Davis claims, again without citation to authority,
that

the

determination

of

employee

status

does not turn on

whether the alleged employee receives money or wages for his
services.

The Utah Supreme Court has stated, however, that:
This Court has articulated several factors
to be considered in establishing whether an
employment relationship exists. . . .
An
employee is hired and paid a salary or
wage, works under the direction of the
employer, and is subject to the employer's
control.

Board of Education of Alpine School District v. Olsen, 684 P.2d
49,

52

(Utah

1984)

(citing Harry

Ashton, 538 P.2d 316 (Utah 1975).
11

L. Young

& Sons,

Inc. v.

None of

those elements

is present

Freier did not work on a regular basis.

in this case.

(R. 269, p. 16.)

Freier was not paid any wage or salary for his work.
p. 32.)
(R.

(R. 269,

There were no foremen or supervisors over the workers.

273, p.

6.)

This

"employment" was

casual.

It was

uncertain, occasional, at irregular intervals and for a limited
and temporary purpose: to move some rocks.
Idaho 284, 215 P.2d 955 (1949).
employee

under

Utah

Lail v. Bishop, 7 0

As such, Freier was a casual

Code Ann. § 35-1-4 3 (l)(b) and not an

"employee" under the Act.
POINT IIIA
(REPLYING TO RESPONDENT'S POINT IIIA)
ALTHOUGH QUESTIONS OF FACT EXIST REGARDING
DAVIS'S EMPLOYMENT STATUS, FREIER MAY PURSUE
HIS CLAIM REGARDLESS OF WHETHER OR NOT DAVIS
WAS SCHRENK'S EMPLOYEE
Freier is not raising questions of Davis's employment
status with Kanarra and Manza for the first time on appeal.
This argument was raised in the trial court in Freier's legal
memorandum
judgment.

in

opposition

to

Davis's

motion

for

summary

The relevant portion of that memorandum was included

in the Addendum of Freier's initial Brief and states:
For all of the reasons stated in Points I
and II of this memorandum, just as Jeremy
Freier was not an employee of the released
defendants, neither was James Davis. (R.
195. )

12

Davis makes two statements
false and misperceive

in Point IIIA which are

Freier's claims.

First, Davis

states

that "the entire foundation of Jeremy Freier's claims against
James Davis is based on the allegation that James Davis was an
employee."

Second, Davis claims that "Jeremy Freier could only

find a duty owed by James Davis to Freier if there was a coemployee relationship, because bystanders do not owe a duty to
prevent the negligent driving of a third party."
Addressing the first statement, Davis's liability is
not based on his employment status, but rather, on his conduct.
While

the

relevant

employment
in

status

determining

doctrine of respondent
against

Davis's

alleged

an

of

a negligent

employer's

employee may be

liability

under

the

superior, Freier makes no such claim
employer.

As

stated

by

the

Utah

Supreme Court:
The liability of the servant arises wholly
because of his personal act in doing the
wrong; it does not arise out of the
relation of master and servant but exists
upon the common law obligation that every
person must so act or use that which he
controls as not to injure another.
Holmstead v. Abbott GM Diesel, 27 Utah 2d 109, 112-13, 493 P.2d
615 (1972) .
If Davis had a duty to supervise

Justin Anderson,

regardless of Davis's employment status, he may be liable for
breach

of

that

duty.

That

brings

incorrect statement.
13

us

to

Davis's

second

Davis claims that

"Jeremy Freier could only find a

duty owed by James Davis to Freier if there was a co-employee
relationship, because bystanders do not owe a duty to prevent
the negligent driving of a third party."

That statement is

false and contrary to accepted principles of negligence law.
If

Davis

had

a

duty

(whether

as

a

supervising

employee, babysitter, or friend doing a favor for Schrenk) to
supervise Anderson and didn't, and that failure to supervise
was a proximate cause of injury to Freier, Freier has stated a
prima facie negligence claim against Davis.

Davis's duty is

not, as Davis claims, conditioned on Davis and Freier being coemployees.
Anderson.

The

relevant

relationship

is between

Davis

and

Davis and Anderson need not be co-employees, as long

as the facts support Davis's duty to supervise Anderson in the
operation of the truck.
babysitter

may

be

liable

supervision drive a car.
there.

For example, a father or mother, or
for

letting

a

child

under

their

There is no employment relationship

Contrary to Davis's uncited claim, a bystander may very

well have a duty to prevent negligent driving of a third party,
if the facts regarding the relationship between the bystander
and

the

third

bystander.

party

create

a

duty

of

supervision

in

the

That is Freier's theory of the case here.
Davis claims the definition of "employee" in the Act

has

nothing

to

do with

the

Release

14

because

the

Release

is

governed by contract law, not the Act.

The Release, however,

does not define "employee."

The Utah Supreme Court has stated

that

or statutes

insofar

as ordinances

are applicable

to a

contract, the ordinance or statute is, by operation of law, an
implied

term

of

contract.

Quagliana

v.

Builders, Inc., 538 P.2d 301 (Utah 1975).
as

defined

in

the

Act,

is

relevant

Exquisite

Home

The term "employee",

and

applicable

to

the

Release and may be considered in interpreting the Release.
POINT IIIB
(REPLYING TO RESPONDENT'S POINT IIIB)
DAVIS WAS NOT A THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY
OF THE RELEASE
Davis argues that he is a third party beneficiary of
the Release, impliedly acknowledging that he is not a party to
the Release

and has no privity of contract.

The rights of

third party beneficiaries are determined by the intentions of
the

parties

"contracting
Dickamore,

to

the

contract,

situation."
652

P.2d

1314,

Tracy
1315

based

on

Collins
(Utah

the
Bank

1982).

contract
&

and

Trust
This

v.

Court

recently stated:
For a third-party beneficiary to have a
right to enforce a right, the intention of
the parties to confer a separate and
distinct benefit upon the third party must
be clear.
Hansen v. Green River Group, 748 P.2d 1102, 1105 (Utah Ct. App.
1988) .
15

For all of the reasons set forth in Point H I D of
Freier's

initial Brief, the parties to the Release had no

intent to confer a benefit upon Davis.

In fact, the only time

Davis is expressly mentioned in the Release is when Freier is
reserving
Davis.

his right to pursue his negligence claim against
That is directly contrary to any claimed intent to

benefit Davis.

As such, Davis cannot be a donee beneficiary.

Davis does not allege, and there does not exist, any
actual

or

supposed

duty

from

Freier

to Davis which would

qualify Davis as a creditor beneficiary.
"a

stranger

thereunder."

to

the

promise

and

Davis is, therefore

may

assert

no

rights

Tracy Collins Bank & Trust v. Dickamore, 652 P.2d

1314, 1315 (Utah 1982).
Assuming without admitting that, as Davis claims, it
was undisputed that Davis was as an employee of Kanarra and
Manza, why would Freier expressly reserve his rights to. pursue
this claim
employee

of

meaningless.

against
Kanarra

Davis, but release Davis if he was an
and Manza?

The

reservation would be

A construction of an agreement which renders any

part of it meaningless should be avoided.

Oregon Bank v.

Nautilus Crane & Equipment Corp., 68 Or. App. 131, 683 P.2d 95
(1984).
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POINT IIIC
(REPLYING TO RESPONDENTS POINT IIIC)
DAVIS PAID NO CONSIDERATION FOR THE RELEASE
AND CANNOT ENFORCE IT
Freier does not argue that no consideration was paid
for the Release.
released

paid

Freier acknowledges that the parties who were

consideration

of

$225,000

for

that Release.

Freier argues that Davis paid no consideration for the Release
and cannot enforce it.
Consideration is an act or a promise bargained for
and given in exchange for a promise.

Resource Management Co.

v. Weston Ranch and Livestock Co., Inc., 706 P.2d 1028, 1036
(Utah 1985).

The parties to the Release delivered $225,000 to

Freier in exchange for Freierrs promise to release them from
further

liability.

nothing.
nothing.

Davis

gave

nothing.

Davis bargained for nothing.

Davis

promised

Freier promised Davis

In fact, Freier expressly reserved his right to

continue pursuing his claim against Davis.
Davis claims
argument.

that Freier

is disingenuous

in this

The disingenuous argument is Davis's argument that

he, a stranger to the Release, paying no consideration, is
somehow pulled under the umbrella of the Release just because
someone, not Davis, paid consideration for it.

If that were

true, a plaintiff could never settle with and release one of
multiple

tortfeasors

and

continue
17

to

pursue

nonsettling

tortfeasors.

Every nonsettling tortfeasor would claim a right

to be released

for the consideration paid by the settling

tortfeasors•
POINT H I D
(REPLYING TO RESPONDENT'S POINT HID)
THE LANGUAGE OF THE RELEASE ALLOWS
FREIER'S CLAIM AGAINST DAVIS
Davis argues that a contract is construed against the
drafter

and

Freier.

then

states

that

this Release was

drafted by

There is no evidence of that; no citation to the

record; no testimony.

It's also not true.

The intent of the parties can be drawn from the
language of

the document

transaction.

Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt v. Blomquist, 773 P.2d

1382

(Utah

1989).

and circumstances

The Release

surrounding the

language, and the express

reservation of rights against Davis, were sufficient evidence
of the parties' intent to defeat Davis's Motion for Summary
Judgment.
was

Davis is wrong to state that no evidence of. intent

offered

in

response

to

the

summary

judgment

motion.

Generally, the document itself is the best evidence, as it is
here, of the parties' intent.
Finally, Davis claims that there is no language in
the

Release

to

show

an

intent

to

cut

off

defendants' liability under respondent superior.
paragraph

of

the

Release

releases
18

the

the

released

The second

defendants

paying

consideration and "their agents, servants, employees.

..."

The language of the Release reserving claims against
Davis

"except as he may be an employee of Border, Kanarra,

Manza.

•

."

can

easily

be

interpreted

to mean

that

the

defendants paying consideration, not Davis, are released from
any liability for a judgment against Davis based on respondent
superior.

In fact, that is a more reasonable and consistent

interpretation under the circumstances of the Release and the
reservation

of

rights.

As

previously

discussed,

Davis's

interpretation renders the reservation meaningless.
CONCLUSION
Based
plaintiffs
reversed

on

request

the

above

that

the

argument
judgment

and
of

authorities,

the

the trial court be

and that the plaintiffs be allowed to pursue their

negligence claim against Davis as a matter of law, or that the
case be remanded to the trial court to determine the issues of
fact regarding

Jeremy

Freier's

and

James

Davis's

employment

status and the intent of the parties to the Release.
DATED this 2 3

day of July, 1990.
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants

By: A.u 4 (IJ
GLEN A. COOK
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I
Point

I

assumes

employees under the Act.

that

Davis

and

Freier

are co-

Freier can pursue this negligence

claim against Davis under Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-57 ("Section
57").

Section 57 is an exception to the exclusive remedy of

Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-60.
to

pursue

negligence

Section 57 allows an injured worker

claims

against

an employer

and/or co-

employee r if the employer does not provide workers' compensation
benefits to the injured worker.

That is the case here.

The

exception of Section 57 applies to negligence claims against the
employer and any negligent co-employee of the injured worker.
POINT II
Jeremy Freier was not an employee of Schrenk, Kanarra
and/or Manza under the Act.

At the least, questions of fact

exist regarding Freier's employment status.

Summary judgment

against Freier on the employment issue was improper.

Davis has

the burden of proving that Freier is an employee because Davis
is seeking the protection of the exclusive remedy provision of
the Act.

Davis has not carried that burden.
Deposition testimony raises questions of fact about

whether Freier was an employee as defined in Utah Code Ann. §351-43 ("Section 43"); whether Schrenk was an employer under Utah

Code Ann. § 35-1-42(3)(a)(ii); and the extent of control, if any,
exercised by Schrenk over Freier,

POINT IIA
Questions
employer

under

therefore,

an

of

Utah

fact exist as to whether Schrenk is an
Code

employer

Ann.

under

§

the

35-1-42(3)(a)(ii)
Act.

This

issue

and

is,

is

also

addressed in Point II.
POINT IIB
The relationship between Freier and Schrenk satisfies
the

casual

43(1)(b).

employment

standard

of

Utah

Code

Ann.

§

35-1-

Freier is not, therefore, an employee under the Act.

Deposition testimony establishes that Freier did not work on a
regular basis, that Freier was not paid any wage for work done,
that the work was

at irregular

intervals

and

for a temporary

purpose, and that there were no foreman or supervisors.over the
workers.

Whether employment

is casual is a question of fact.

Summary judgment was improper.
POINT IIIA
Freier may pursue his negligence claim against Davis
whether or not Davis was Schrenk's employee.

Davis's liability

is based on his conduct, not his employment status with Schrenk.
If Davis had a duty to supervise Justin Anderson, regardless of

Davis's employment status, he may be liable if he breached that
duty*

Davis's claim that Davis can only owe a duty to Freier if

Davis and Freier are co-employees is false.

If the facts show a

duty on Davis's part to supervise Anderson, it doesn't matter
whether Davis and Freier are co-employees.

That duty would

extend to all third parties.

POINT IIIB
Davis is not a third party beneficiary of the Release.
The rights of third party beneficiaries are determined by the
intent of the parties to the contract.

That intent must be

clear.

The parties to the Release had no intent to benefit

Davis.

In fact, the only specific reference to Davis in the

Release is where Freier reserves his right to pursue this claim.
That reservation is directly contrary to any intent to benefit
Davis.

POINT IIIC
Davis paid no consideration for the Release and cannot
enforce it.

Freier acknowledges that the parties released under

the Release paid consideration.

Davis didn't.

Consideration is

an act or a promise bargained for and given in exchange for a
promise.

Davis gave nothing for the Release.

nothing and bargained for nothing.

Davis promised

Davis cannot pull himself

under the umbrella

of the Release simply because someone else

paid consideration for the Release.
POINT H I D

against

The

language

Davis.

The

of

the

language

Release
of

allows

the Release

Freier's
and

the

claim
circum-

stances surrounding the Release establish the intent to reserve
Freier's liability claims against Davis.

The Release language

reserving claims against Davis "except as he may be an employee
of Border, Kanarra, Manza. . . . " i s consistently and reasonably
interpreted to release the parties who paid consideration from
vicarious liability.

Davis's interpretation of the reservation

language renders the reservation meaningless.
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